Account by Brigadier HJB Cracroft, Commander

INTRODUCTION

During the planning of the invasion of Normandy I was warned that as soon as the initial objectives had been obtained, I should be put in command of a Mobile Column to exploit, as an independent force, with the objective of capturing the centre of communications at VILLERS-BOCAGE. I was asked to submit a plan. I had maps and air photographs to work from.

In making my plans I took into consideration the following factors:-

1. I wanted one or two intermediate objectives which I could hold tactically whilst I regrouped my forces if necessary.
2. I wanted two lines of advance, so that, if opposition or obstacles were met on one, I could switch to the other.
3. I wanted to avoid using main roads because I thought on these I was likely to to run head on into enemy reinforcements moving forward and should get involved in battles which would divert me from my objective.
4. I thought that by staying as far forward as possible I should have a shorter distance to go and a shorter line of communication to keep open.

Accordingly, I recommended my start line should be the main road BAYEUX-CAEN. My intermediate objectives were to be:-

1. Pts 103 and 102
2. The TESSEL - BRETTEVILLE feature
3. High ground Northeast of VILLERS-BOCAGE.

My axis of advance was to be:-

This plan was approved and it was decided that the Mobile Column should be formed as soon as possible after the D Day objectives had been captured.

NARATIVE

7th June
Due to delays in capturing some of the objectives, tanks were still fighting on D+1 and it was not until 2200hrs that orders were issued for the exploitation forces to assemble.

We assembled during the night of7/8th in the area BRECY - RUCQUEVILLE. The forces consisted of:-

8th June
The advance started at midday on the 8th of June.
On right axis 61 Recce Regt supported by 4/7 DG.
On left axis 24th Lancers.

On the right we soon ran into opposition in LOUCELLES but after some fighting captured the village but were held up just South of it. There was strong 88mm opposition in the area where the road crossed the railway.

On the left 24 Lancers ran into very strong opposition in the area PUTOT EN BESSIN. The country here was very thick and the enemy appeared to have a number of anti tank guns we lost tanks and in spite of every effort to outflank the village it became apparent that further advance without infantry support would not be possible. Unfortunately I had no infantry for this task and accordingly I decided to abandon the attempt to break out on this axis and to concentrate all my efforts on the axis LOUCELLES - Pt.103, and ordered 24 Lancers to switch their attack to LOUCELLES. The country on this line was very thick and very built-up, and it was apparent that we should need considerable infantry support to get the tanks through it.

As my Motor Battalion 12 KRRC had been excluded from the earlier loading tables, a battalion from 131 Brigade, 1 Dorsets, were allotted to me for this role and quite magnificently did they carry it out, although they had never worked with armour before and the nearest that they came to a Motor Battalion in the matter of equipment was to have one company (A) equipped with cycles. Their CO joined my Tac HQ on the morning of the 8th and not long afterward the remainder of the Battalion moved into the assembly area at RUCQUEVILLE, where they came under my command.

I thought at this time that there was probably only a thin crust of German defence and that if I could once break through there would be no further organised resistance.

At about 1600 hrs I therefore moved 1 Dorsets into LOUCELLES to replace 61 Recce Regt who were unsuitable for the dismounted fighting which was now necessary. As soon as this regrouping had taken place the advance continued and we succeeded in capturing the crossing over the railway South of LOUCELLES. By dark we had advanced into the northern outskirts of AUDRIEU.

The 4/7th DG spent an unpleasant night in LE BAS D'AUDRIEU with themselves at one end of the village and the Germans at the other - between them, about one hundred yards of no-man's land containing a knocked out enemy armoured car.

9th June
I ordered the 1st Dorsets, supported by 4/7th DG, to continue to advance through AUDRIEU and ordered the SRY to recce the open ground to the right to find out if it was possible to cross the railway West of the station. I hoped to outflank AUDRIEU.

I got a report that this crossing was possible and was clear of the enemy. It is of interest to note that on June 7th C Sqn of 4/7th DG had already made a recce of this crossing with a view to continuing to Pt 103 but though they had reached the railway without difficulty, two tanks of the leading troop had been knocked out by an 88mm in trying to cross it.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting was continuing in AUDRIEU. I again regrouped my forces and, placing 8th Durham Light Infantry, who had come under my command that morning at 0650 hrs, under command of SRY, I ordered them to move across country in a wide sweep, outflanking AUDRIEU, on to Pt 103 with one squadron of tanks in front and 8th DLI carried on the other two squadrons. I joined SRY and we motored quickly forward into Pt 103, meeting no opposition. The enemy were so surprised at this manoeuvre that only a few shots were fired at us from AUDRIEU and LE HAUT D'AUDRIEU as we advanced.

By 1300 hrs we were firmly established at Pt 103. I ordered 24th Lancers and 147 Fd Regt to move up and join me at Pt 103. While this was being done, I carried out a recce with the COs of 24th L, 8th DLI and 147 Fd Regt for an action on ST PIERRE.

This attack went in about 1730 hrs, supported by the SP guns of 147 Fd Regt and MG fire from 5th Cheshires. My decision to press on at once from Pt 103 to ST PIERRE was strengthened by a POW report that ST PIERRE was only lightly held.

The village in fact proved to be held more heavily than anticipated and there was constant shelling from the forward slopes across the valley, but by 1900 hrs most of the opposition in the village had been overcome.

Though 8th DLI were not able to cross the river SEULLES, they covered the easternmost of the two bridges between ST PIERRE and TILLY SUR SEULLES.

There is no doubt that we were lucky to get into ST PIERRE so quickly but our luck was in part due to the speed of advance which took the enemy by surprise before he had time to react effectively to the threat of our domination.

Pt 103 dominated the surrounding country to the East and South and overlooked JUVIGNY and TILLY SUR SEULLES which was the hub of the German opposition; Pt 103 was thus an extremely important feature. Soon after we arrived there we saw large columns of Germans moving Northwards out of TILLY towards BAYEUX and Eastwards along the road JUVIGNY - FONTENAY LE PESNEL. We attacked these columns and succeeded in stopping all further movement, but enemy opposition strengthened and a number of enemy tanks shot us up at 103 and we lost some tanks from their 88mm fire.

We had quickly realised that our tanks were out-matched by both enemy tanks and enemy anti-tank guns and that in a straight fight at anything over point-blank range, the advantage lay with the enemy every time. Our losses on Pt 103 sharply confirmed this realisation. Thus until the tanks were withdrawn from the forward slopes of the 103 feature to hull-down positions (their place being taken by a light recce screen) we suffered a number of casualties from enemy weapons firing at long range from the woods North of TILLY across the SEULLES valley. The armour of the Sherman rarely resisted any armour piercing shot except at extreme ranges and when it was pierced the tank usually burst into flames almost spontaneously.

The 75mm gun, though an accurate weapon and excellent for HE, had no powers of penetration to deal with Tigers or head-on Panthers. It is true that the 17pdr was on a par with the German guns but they were strictly limited in numbers and were only carried in the thin-skinned Shermans and M10 SPs, upon which the enemy always concentrated his fire. Probably the long 75mm of the Panther was an even better armour piercing gun than the 88mm of the Tiger, but the Panther, unlike the Tiger, was vulnerable in the flanks and the rear. The 75mm in the German Mark IV was slightly better than our own 75mm but the Mark IV was inferior to the Sherman as a fighting machine and there was a reasonable chance in an engagement of obtaining the decision. Only the German Mark III, obsolete and rarely encountered, was definitely inferior to the Sherman in every respect.

As a whole, in Normandy, the Allied armies had a vast numerical superiority in tanks and SPs over the enemy, but this superiority was difficult to exploit in the extremely close country of the BOCAGE, which lent itself admirably to the defensive tactics of the heavy German AFVs, by limiting the mobility of our larger and generally speedier AFVs. It was poor consolation to know that the Panther was vulnerable in flank and rear and the enemy SPs were vulnerable if located, when one was denied by the country in the powers of manoeuvre necessary to expose those thin flanks and rear in the one case and when one was only likely to locate the hidden SP by the expensive process of losing at least the first tank to come within its sights.

During the late afternoon I had reports from ST PIERRE of heavy enemy fire from TILLY and it soon became apparent that the Germans were holding it strongly. Similarly, armoured recce which moved South from ST PIERRE came under heavy enemy fire.

I ordered 1 Dorsets, with 4/7th DG, to move up as soon as possible to Pt 103, to consolidate its capture - if necessary outflanking and leaving behind opposition in AUDRIEU and the villages South of it. In fact, the capture of AUDRIEU had been completed by 0845 hrs.

By the evening of the 9th, ST PIERRE was held, the 1 Dorsets and 4/7th DG had joined me at 103, where I placed the CO 1 Dorsets (with A Company, 5 Cheshires, less one platoon under command) in charge of the lay-out of the ground defences. We had had a heavy day fighting and had succeeded in stopping all further enemy movement Northwards and Eastwards. 4/7th DG, firing at enemy Panthers moving South down the SEULLES valley, had managed to knock out one at a range of upwards of 4,000 yards, with a lucky hit on the engine covers with HE.

Though the day had been a success, the SRY war diary rather plaintively records, "the days are very long". During the evening I issued orders for holding the ground we had won. The 8th DLI, with one squadron 24th Lancers in support, were ordered to hold ST PIERRE. The 24th Lancers less one squadron were ordered to hold the West and Southern part of 103, with 1 Dorsets holding the Southeast, East and Northeast, with 4/7th DG in support. The SRY I ordered to move back to the area BRECY so that they could re-form, re-fit and get some rest. It became apparent towards the evening that the enemy had moved back into LE HAUT D'AUDRIEU.

The night was passed rather uncomfortably with considerable enemy mortaring of the 103 position. 3Plt of 5th Cheshires had a particularly unpleasant encounter. An enemy patrol in two parties approached the Platoon's position at Pt 103 and when the first party was challenged its members threw up their hands in surrender. Rather unwisely, on seeing this, three privates went forward to bring in their prisoners when, without warning, the second enemy party opened fire, inflicting wounds from which all three men subsequently died. However, the Platoon's guns opened up on the patrol, killing three and wounding others, before the remainder surrendered - a total of two officers and twelve men.

10th June
I had hoped to be able to continue the advance southward to my next objective TESSEL - BRETTEVILLE feature but it soon became apparent that enemy opposition was stronger than I expected. On looking back at it now in view of the large enemy columns of both tanks and infantry which we had halted the day before it is not surprising that this opposition was strong.

In the early morning I got a report that the enemy were counter-attacking ST PIERRE and for a short time the 8th DLI were driven out but they counter-attacked at first light and we succeeded in reorganising and by re-attacking with the 24th Lancers, ST PIERRE except for the southern and western portions was recaptured and the 8th DLI re-established by 1130 hrs. during this time another enemy counter attack had come in from the direction of CRISTOT but this was driven off by 1 Dorsets and 4/7th DG.

During the morning I also got reports of bodies of enemy infantry moving in towards 103 from the West, i.e. From the area BUCEELS and STE BAZIRE. I dealt with this by ordering the SRY to move up from BRECY and by clearing the area South of the railway and up to the river NW of 103. SRY linked up with 24th Lancers in ST PIERRE, after having made contact with elements of 7th Armd Div who were driving South from BAYEUX to TILLY but were unable to get beyond BUCEELS.

By the afternoon all counter attacks had been driven off, with an estimated loss to the enemy of 2 Tigers, 4 Mark IVs and 3 75mm SP guns, and most of ST PIERRE was again in our hands. I realised however that the situation on Pt 103 was going to be rather uncomfortable and I was anxious to avoid if possible the heavy mortaring to which we had been subjected the night before. The only way in which it seemed possible to achieve this was to send out patrols to try and drive the enemy further away from us out of mortar range.

The 8th DLI were fully committed in ST PIERRE and the 1 Dorsets who had had very heavy fighting ever since landing were committed to holding the vital 103 feature. With all of my infantry committed I only had tanks available for patrols. I accordingly ordered SRY to send out squadron patrols in the East and Southeast direction and gave them the support of 147 Fd Regt. These patrols soon made contact with the enemy and succeeded in inflicting quite a lot of casualties as well as finding good targets for the artillery. I think they paid a handsome dividend.

That evening I ordered the SRY to relieve the 4/7th DG in support of 1 Dorsets and to relieve 24th Lancers on 103. I moved the 4/7th DG back to the area BRECY to rest and re-fit. I move the whole of 24th Lancers into ST PIERRE as the 8th DLI who had had heavy casualties needed strong support and I was anxious not to lose the village again.

After the fighting we had been through it was obviously necessary to bring up ammunition and petrol; food, of course, was also necessary. I had had assembled during the morning a column of some 60 lorries in the area of ST LEGER, ready to move forward whenever a favourable opportunity occurred. This column was moved forward in the early afternoon after the SRY had cleared up the area NW of 103. As it moved up under tank escort, it was subjected to some small arms fire from the AUDRIEU area into which the enemy had again infiltrated. There were no serious casualties however. Supplies were delivered and the column returned again under tank escort, taking back wounded amongst whom was my Brigade Major.

When the supply column arrived an American officer came with it in a jeep. He said he was a liaison officer from the American 155mm Regt and he asked if I would like any heavy artillery support. As can be imagined I was delighted to see him and gave him a number of targets which were out of range of my own 147 Fd Regt.

During the afternoon I also got an offer of support through the Commander 50th Div of fire from a battleship. I again indicated a number of targets and we were delighted to see some good shooting with 15" guns. This was directed by an air OP.

11 June
In spite of our patrols we had another uncomfortable night from enemy mortar fire. It was heavy and went on nearly all night.

The Commander 50 Div came up and visited 103 and discussed the situation and decided that in view of the strength of the enemy against us it was quite useless at the present to try and push out further South. He therefore instructed me to hold the 103 feature and ST PIERRE if possible.

Meanwhile 69 Bde were to hold on my left from Pt 103 Northeast to a wood between BRONAY and the BAYEUX-CAEN road, (892731) and 1 Dorsets were to be relieved in the evening by 5th East Yorkshires.

Southeast of Pt 103 lay the high ground round Pt 102 just South of CRISTOT; to command these two points was to be in control of the whole area round about for several miles. In order, therefore, to try and relieve the pressure on our left and to keep the enemy from carrying out close reconnaissance of our positions, an attack was organised for the evening to capture CRISTOT and to push on beyond it to capture Pt 102.

In the morning in preparation for this attack, I ordered 4/7th DG to carry out a reconnaissance in force. B Sqn and the CO reached the village and saw a great many infantry about but met no organised resistance. The probability is that they disorganised an enemy counter-attack as it was forming up; but also that the enemy were thereby forewarned of the impending attack in the evening.

This attack was to be carried out jointly with 69 Bde. 69 Bde were to direct 7th Green Howards on BRONAY to secure my left flank and to make contact with the 3rd Canadian Division at PUTOT-EN-BESSIN. I was to command the attack on CRISTOT with 6th Green Howards under command supported by 4/7th DG, 147 Fd Regt, A Sqn 24th Lancers and A Sqn SRY. SRY were patrolling South and Southeast of Pt 103 and I ordered A Sqn to work Northeast to Pt 102 to provide right flank protection for the attack and to gain observation of the JUVIGNY - FONTENAY road.

At 1700 hrs the 6th GH passed through 1 Dorsets in the attack on a two company front with one squadron in support of the leading companies, one squadron moving with the reserve companies and one squadron ready to escort the Bn support weapons to their objective. The guns fired on known targets and one hedge ahead of the advance. I gave the CO of 6th GH permission to use his discretion about withdrawal and in the event the tanks of 4/7th DG just managed to reach the outskirts of CRISTOT and the infantry one field short of the objective, but both suffered heavy losses in the process and it was obvious that CRISTOT could not be captured without severe casualties in men and tanks. Added to this a strong enemy attack with Tiger tanks against Pt 103 had developed South at the axis of advance and threatened it. The attack was therefore called off and both infantry and tanks retired within the Pt 103 position.

Though the attack had failed to capture its objective, my main object had been to relieve the pressure on Pt 103 and drive the enemy further away. This we had achieved and it is possible that the attempt broke up an enemy infantry attack designed to coincide with their armoured attack on Pt 103. This armoured attack I will deal with separately below. Even if we had captured CRISTOT, I doubt if we should have been able with the forces available to have held it as I could not afford to risk losing the vital 103 feature. 69 Bde to the North just failed to reach BRONAY but established themselves along the main road North and south through AUDRIEU, thus giving secure flank protection to my positions on 103.

Certain lessons were to be learnt from this attack. It occurred at a time when the Army's initial advance was losing impetus and the contact battle was merging into static warfare; the enemy was recovering from his first shock and was fighting to the death. Though not deeply entrenched he was using the thick, close, natural cover of the BOCAGE - hedgerows, sunken roads ditches, orchard and woods. In this thick leafy country the advantage is with the defenders who can stay still and hold their fire until the last moment - tanks are blind.

This attack showed that in close country tanks cannot lead the infantry - they must advance side by side - and even in more open country the best support that the tanks can give is from a position slightly in rear or to the flank. In this attack in close country the tanks and infantry quickly lost contact and their mutual protection; the tanks became victims of the anti-tank guns and the infantry the victims of the spandaus which opened up as the tanks passed forward out of reach and sight of the infantry. B Sqn 4/7th DG returned with only two out of the 9 tanks with which they began and, despite 25 - 30 prisoners taken, 6th GH suffered proportionately heavy casualties. So much for the action on CRISTOT. I now turn to the sequel from which I think the enemy also may have learnt some similar lessons.

During the afternoon I attended a conference with HQ 7th Armd Div which had been ordered to move up on my right flank and capture TILLY exploiting forward if possible to capture VILLERS-BOCAGE. They reached the Northern outskirts of TILLY about 1700 hrs.

I was to carry out a simultaneous attack to assist them. At the conference it was decided that 8th Armd Bde should attack and capture TESSEL - BRETTEVILLE feature so as to assist 7 Armd Div and protect their left flank. I returned from the conference about 1800 hrs. as I came up the track from CHOUAIN in my scout car I heard very heavy firing from 103 and a lot of 88mm shells whistled over my head. I arrived on 103 to find a very heavy German infantry and tank attack was coming in from the direction of FONTENAY-LE-PESNEL. It was the only German attack of its sort that I ever saw and was in the approved style of infantry and tanks coming in together. Our tanks were severely handicapped because the Germans were supported by a number of 88mm tanks which were standing off and shelling us with great effect from rather long ranges - the shells burst in the treetops and created a shrapnel effect on those below. The only tanks which we had that could penetrate them were a very few 17pdr Shermans. Most of the five of these that we had per Regt were already knocked out.

For a time the situation was extremely tense. To add to the confusion, just before the enemy attack began, a second supply column had reached the 103 area and was "milling" about, generally in the way. I ordered it to retire at once and at speed. The tanks on the forward edge had to withdraw slightly under cover of smoke. The flashes of their guns mingled with the tracer of enemy shells and in the middle of it all an ammunition truck and an SP gun were hit and caught fire. About four tigers actually reached the position and for a short while pandemonium reigned. But at last they were driven off. In all the enemy had used some 18 tanks mostly Tigers with a sprinkling of Mark IVs. I went up to see the CO of 1 Dorsets who were quire magnificent and were holding their ground very firmly in spite of heavy casualties which included practically the whole Orderly Room staff. After some severe fighting which lasted until 2230 hrs we managed to drive off this counter-attack and remain in position but in doing so had had heavy casualties both to our infantry and tanks. The enemy retired under cover of smoke.

Meanwhile the day had been one of shelling for the 8th DLI in ST PIERRE. In the late afternoon I ordered C Sqn SRY to probe South in support of 7th Armd Div with whom 8th DLI were trying to gain contact but they were held up by tank and anti-tank gun fire. Enemy tank movements had been reported constantly and they were known to be West of the village on the far side of the SEULLES bridge. During the evening the 8th DLI and SRY positions were heavily shelled and were under constant spandau fire from the high ground to the South.

At 2050 hrs the ST PIERRE sector received its share of the enemy armoured attack and for a time was cut off from the main Bde position on the 103 feature. The CO of the 8th DLI had to abandon his jeep and make a hazardous journey back from a conference at Bde HQ on foot through the maelstrom. The attack however was not pressed and by dusk the enemy had withdrawn.

The enemy attack had delayed the relief of 1 Dorsets by the 5th East Yorks from 69 Bde and this relief was not completed until midday on the 12th. We reorganised ourselves in for the night. Altogether an eventful and unpleasant Sunday.

12th June
We again had another uncomfortable night. I think, however, that our attack had achieved some success as the enemy mortaring was less intense and more inaccurate than previously. The night before I had issued Warning Orders for the attack on the TESSEL - BRETTEVILLE feature. A further conference was held and detailed orders of the attack were issued. The attack was to start from ST PIERRE with the first objective the high ground overlooking La Caude Rus. The second objective the road JUVIGNY - FONTENAY-LE-PESNEL. The attack was to be carried out by 24th Lancers and SRY with elements from 8th DLI. On our left we could hear and see part of 7th Armd Div attack which appeared to start well but soon came up against very strong opposition in the Northern outskirts of TILLY. Our attack from ST PIERRE went in during the morning but the leading tanks soon came under very strong fire from enemy tanks. The main difficulty was due to the fact that we were going in with both flanks in the air. To counteract this in some measure A Sqn SRY again worked towards Pt 102 and found that some Tigers and Panthers had moved up into the woods during the night. The enemy infantry lying low and firing Piats from close range knocked out some tanks belonging to 24th Lancers. We succeeded in capturing the first objective but any advance beyond that was quite impossible.

The 7th Armd Div were completely held up North of TILLY. We held the first objective until late in the afternoon hoping that 7th Armd Div would succeed in capturing TILLY and would thereby relieve some of the pressure on our front. When it became apparent that TILLY was not to be captured I withdrew 24th Lancers and SRY back into ST PIERRE.

Meanwhile 69 Bde with 6 and 7 GH and 5th EY made a rather optimistic attack on my left flank in the wooded area between CRISTOT and ST PIERRE and suffered very heavy casualties.

Following orders that 50 Div were to hold the line from Pt 103 - La BELLE EPINE and would contain the enemy on this front, under direct orders from the Commander 50 Div and much to my regret in view of the struggle that ST PIERRE had cost me I ordered 24th Lancers to cover the withdrawal of 8th DLI from the village.

With 69 Bde holding Pt 103 with 5 EYs and the road to LOUCELLES held by 146 Bde who had relieved 69 Bde in that area, the whole scene of the operation of the mobile column was static. There ceased to be a raison d'être for its existence and it was disbanded in the evening. I ordered the 4/7th DG and SRY to move back just South of BAYEUX to rest while I remained in support in the 103 area with Bde HQ, 24th Lancers and 147 Fd Regt. For the first time since we had reached Pt 103 we had a comparatively quiet night.

My original objective had been VILLERS-BOCAGE and my object interdictions to prevent the movement of enemy reinforcements into the bridgehead at a time when it was vitally important that the bridgehead should be enlarged to give space for manoeuvre and the build up of forces. In fact, by capturing the 103 feature dominating as it did the road centres of TILLY and JUVIGNY I was in time to place an effective check on the movements of enemy troop to the North and East, without the necessity of reaching the VILLERS-BOCAGE area. However the appreciation by 50 Div that, as the threat of the advance of 7 Armd Div round the enemy's West flank made itself felt, it was quite possible that the enemy would withdraw from the front particularly on our right proved over optimistic.

We were up against picked troops from the PANZER LEHR, 12th SS PANZER, and 21st PANZER Divisions and they fought with fanatical determination. The incident with the 5th Cheshires shows that they were also treacherous and cruel enemies; this was even more strongly endorsed when 1st Dorsets found rows of Canadians from the 3rd Canadian Div laid out behind the chateau at PABIE. These men had been fighting in an attack on BRONAY and after capture had been foully murdered by the 12th SS Division. Mercifully for us the enemy had little artillery other than anti-tank SP guns in the area although the 88mm HE shells and their mortars seemed at times to be a very adequate substitute.

Though our casualties in men and tanks had been severe I have no doubt that the operation paid a sound dividend. The movement of enemy reinforcements was checked, severe casualties were inflicted on him and we ourselves learned valuable lessons about the problems of warfare in the BOCAGE - in particular the need for the closest infantry and tank co-operation in the attack.