Troop Dispositions.

The Plan.

138 Inf Brigade (6 Royal West Kents, 5 Buffs and 8 Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders) under command with 1 Surreys and North Irish Horse (army tanks) and supported by most of the 78th Divisional Artillery, were detailed for the attack on “Longstop”.

1. 6 R.W.K. and 5 Buffs were to lead the attack with 8 A. and S.H. in reserve.
2. The start line for the attack ran north-west and south-east through Chassart—Teffaha. The objective for the 6 R.W. K. was the high ground north and south of Dr. ech Chaibine 5942. The objective for 5 Buffs, whose task was to protect the left flank from any German counter-attacks from the high ground to the north, was pt 303, 5843 pt. 196, 5943 and Dj Bechtab 5843. .
3. 8 A and S.Hs in reserve were to pass through the 6 R.Y.K. and, seize Dj el Rhar (i.e. the right hand end of LONGSTOP in the photograph above).
4. 1 Surreys with the N.I.H. were to be prepared to exploit north-eastwards in daylight along the road to Tebourba.

The attack.

23rd April.

Accordingly, soon after dawn, the Commander, 138 Brigade, appreciating that his original plan had been too ambitious, went forward and made a further plan for 8 A. and S.H. and 1 Surreys, supported by the North Irish Horse, to seize the Dj el Ahmera, i.e. the western half of Longstop. ( the left hand part of the hill shown in the photograph above). Owing to some delays in laying on the artillery support, it was not possible to start this attack before 1330 hrs. At this hour, supported by very heavy artillery concentrations, 8 A. and S.H. went up the Dj el Ahmera ridge with great dash through heavy machine-gun fire.

Casualties were heavy and included the Commanding Officer (Lt.-Col. McNabb), his Intelligence Officer and Adjutant. By 1530 hrs, after going in with the bayonet, 8 A. and S.H. had captured the hill. In this attack the Argylls were supported along the Southern slopes of Longstop by two Squadrons of the North Irish Horse. When night fell, Dj el Ahmera was held by 8 A. and S.H. and 1 Surreys, both battalions being very weak owing to shortage of strength and casualties. The remains of 6 R.W.K. had moved closer up in reserve. The whole force on Dj el Ahmera was now under command of Lt.-Colonel Wilberforce of 1 Surreys. An attempt by the 6 R.W.K. during the night to capture Dj el Rhar failed owing to heavy mortar fire on their forming-up place.

24th 4pril.

25th April.

26th April

    There are a number of important lessons which can be drawn from this engagement.

1. The Germans fought hardest on the Dj el Ahmera. Yet a walk over the battle field afterwards disclosed far fewer dug-in positions on this half of the hill than there were on the Rhar. On this latter hill the Germans had carried out large excavations involving hundreds of tons which they removed from caves and dugouts and tipped down the hill.

   Part only of the extensive excavations carried out on the Rhar.

   If they had only put in as much work on their actual defences as they had done on their dugouts to avoid artillery bombardment and air attack Dj el Ahmera would have formed a tougher proposition than in fact it did.

2. Some of the positions from which they actually fought were indifferently sited. Owing to the bad siting of an anti-tank gun, a Churchill tank was able to approach it in dead ground and then engage it at 10 yards range.

TACTICS
Morale.

1. Before dealing with tactics some mention of morale is necessary. Cases have occurred in which infantry, faced with an attack in which they had not complete confidence, asked for and received, a few Churchill tanks to “bolster up morale”. In the subsequent attacks the tanks have accompanied the infantry and fired off their guns at nothing in particular and the attack has been successful. I question whether, by such tactics, the junior commanders have “bolstered up morale”. Surely all they have achieved is to bolster up the reliance placed by the infantry on the tank. The same argument has been used for keeping Churchill tanks in the foremost defended localities for days at a time after the arrival of anti-tank guns. This the Army Commander views with horror.
2. I would emphasise that such tactics have only been occasional isolated incidents and chiefly confined to troops with little battle experience. But it is just the sort of thing that might be indulged in by troops new to the rigours of war and I think it is of sufficient importance to warrant being mentioned early.
3. The word morale is continually being used by the regimental officer. It is an extremely complex subject upon which many officers, particularly those with a limited experience of man management, are somewhat ill-informed. It is sometimes brought forward as the reason for some course of action which it tactically unsound. To indulge in false tactics for the sake of improved morale is like taking the first dose of a dangerous drug. There is no foreseeing to where it may lead you. The commander must keep the question of morale at the back of his mind but he must never let it come to the front of his thoughts so much as to cloud his clear reasoning. In general it seems that the following guidance might be of help to officers who are without that invaluable battle experience which has been gained by the troops here.
   1. If a commanders only reason for some course of action is to improve morale, his plan is probably unsound and he should try something else.

      or stated somewhat differently

   2. If false tactics are indulged in for the sale of improved morale, the morale effect produced may be the reverse of that anticipated.

4. Generally I was most impressed by the high morale of our troops. As a result of conversations with our commanders it is clear that good morale as always is produced by:-
   1. Success in battle as a result of a unit’s own efforts.
   2. Good administrative arrangements. (I heard nothing from regimental officers but unqualified praise of the ‘Q’ arrangements of the campaign. In fact, as one commander put it to me, it was more the first class food which the soldier has had throughout the campaign than anything else that has enabled him to stand up to the worst rigours of the winter).
   3. Strict discipline.

5. These factors have not been lacking in the First Army and have all played their part in the victorious conclusion of the campaign.

   THE DEFENCE

   The Lay Out

6. First consideration must be given to the use which the Germans have put the reverse slopes of hills and knolls in the defence. His lay-out seems to be governed by the following rules:-
   1. Avoid the top of the hill unless your presence there is completely concealed.
   2. Tuck your MGs and anti-tank guns on to the side slopes, defiladed if possible, with areas of fire mutually covering the front.
   3. Keep your main force concealed behind the hill for counter-attack. In undulating country this may mean 300 to 400 yards back but in very hilly country they have usually been just behind the crest.
   4. Cover your front with minefields or other anti-tank obstacles.
   5. Range your mortars and artillery onto possible enemy forming up places and onto your own FDLs.
   6. Dig yourself in. if there are rocks so much the better.

ARTILLERY WEAPONS
Fragmentation of Shells.

1. The use of artillery has been the outstanding success of the campaign. The German soldier definitely dislikes it but from my own investigations in the prisoner of war cages I am satisfied that he is under no delusions as regards the efficiency of our shell. It was described to me as “only noise”, “does not inflict many casualties”, “only dander from direct hits”, etc. etc. below is a photograph of shell fragments picked up at random on the top of LONGSTOP. If we are to get real lethal effect from our artillery it is essential that we do something to increase the fragmentation of our shells.

   Air-burst HE

2. There is a universal demand for air-burst HE. In spite of repeated questions I was unable to find any gunner who was not confident that he could use it. The enemy is expert at digging-in and we must have something that is able to get at him in his slit-trenches. The opinion generally was that, as artillery frequently found themselves up in the front line with the infantry, they wanted to be able to air-burst their HE at all distances from the gun, including those at very short ranges in order to deal with the enemy infantry coming in to attack.

   Longer Range Artillery.

3. There is a universal demand for guns with a longer range. Longer range is held to be of greater importance than size of shell. The American 155mm LONG TOM is thus in great demand, both for its range and accuracy and is looked upon with envy by British gunners and with respect by the Germans. German prisoners did however disclose to me an unconfirmed report that too high a percentage of its shells were ‘duds’.

4. This demand for greater ranges of artillery pieces also extends to armoured divisions who are emphatic that they want in their artillery organisation:-
   • One regiment of 25pdrs
   • One regiment of SP guns (Priest)
   • One Medium regiment.
   The Priest has proved itself an excellent piece and is just what is required.

   Anti-Tank Guns

5. There may have been some idea in England a month ago that the 17pdr anti-tank gun might prove itself a white elephant in battle. Recent events in North Africa have quite disproved any such idea. It has been invaluable. The consensus of opinion is that commanders would like to have ½ to 2/3 of their anti-tank guns as 17pdr, the remainder being 6pdr to cover the flanks or rear of the 17pdr, or to put into positions where it would be difficult to conceal a 17pdr.
6. I have also been impressed by the arguments in favour of the SP anti-tank gun.
   1. Most of the casualties to enemy tanks have been achieved by the offensive use of anti-tank guns; that is by bringing them quickly up into position rather than being lucky enough to have them in the right position when the enemy tanks have appeared.
   2. In the difficult country in which infantry have operated with tanks, the anti-tank guns have found themselves unable to keep up with the infantry. As a result Churchill tanks have been held by the infantry in the false role of the ant-tank gun.
   3. An anti-tank gun capable of keeping up with the Churchill is required to enable it to deal with the PK VI, Tiger.
7. I would therefore recommend that the possibility of mounting the 17pdr anti-tank gun SP should be investigated.